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n 22 January 2014, the European Commission is expected to publish the proposals 
for the 2030 Framework for Climate and Energy Policies, which will be discussed 
and possibly – or maybe, partly – agreed during the 20-21 March 2014 European 
Council. This is the first comprehensive review of the 2007-09 Climate and Energy Package, 
which resulted in the so-called ‘20-20-20’ targets by 2020.  
The principal intention is to define the EU’s climate change and energy policy framework for 
the period beyond 2020. With the year 2020 being just ‘around the corner’, it is high time to 
define the rules for the next decade and beyond to give investors an adequate amount of 
predictability if not certainty.   
The ‘2030 Framework’, however, is not just about predictability; it is also about making the 
proper adjustments based on the lessons learned. These lessons stem mainly from the 
implementation of the 2007-09 Climate and Energy Package and the changed circumstances, 
but also from the new issues that have emerged in the interim.   
To this end, the European Commission, through its Communication of April 2013,1 has 
launched a stakeholder consultation process focusing on i) targets, ii) instruments, iii) 
competitiveness and security of supply and iv) capacity and distributional aspects.  
This Commentary asks what the main lessons are and how they should influence the 2030 
Framework. Or put differently, what are the conditions that the “2030 Framework” will need 
to meet in order to offer a viable package for discussion? 
 
 
                                                      
1	European Commission, “A 2030 framework for climate and energy policies”, COM (2013) 169, 27 
March 2013.	
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Changes in the EU and the international landscape  
There are many ways of grouping the experiences and changes that have occurred since the 
2007-09 Climate and Energy Package has been adopted. They have been described before in 
greater details.2  We will group them as follows: 
  When implementing the 2007-09 Climate and Energy Package, member states’ energy 
policies diverged to such an extent that they undermined the completion of the internal 
energy market. Increasingly national solutions inform member states’ policies, thereby 
undermining the prospect of efficient market and ‘least-cost’ solutions.  
  The economic crisis, which has contributed to achieving EU GHG emissions reduction 
targets, has also made industry margins shrink, and so too the industry’s ability to invest 
in existing and new facilities in the EU. Most governments’ fiscal room for manoeuvre 
was strongly reduced. Investment in R&D, infrastructure, training and education and, 
more generally, support to manage the transition are becoming more difficult.  
  The euro crisis has aggravated European heterogeneity. There has always been a marked 
difference between the EU-15 and EU-10, i.e. those member states from Central and 
Eastern Europe that joined after 2004. The new element is the number of member states, 
especially in the periphery, that are subject to austerity policies.  
  The changing global energy outlook has altered the global energy security landscape. 
Security of energy supply concerns, related both to import dependency and prices, are 
receding in some parts of the world. At the same time, major discrepancies in energy 
prices between regions, notably within the OECD, have emerged and are expected to 
persist, even if the exact level remains subject to debate. ‘Something’ might have changed, 
but it is not clear what the responses will or should be.   
  There is a different appetite in global governance from the days when the Kyoto Protocol 
was negotiated and the lead-in to the 2009 Copenhagen climate change conference. This 
manifests itself currently through the inability to reach a global climate change agreement, 
as well as through the expectation of decentralised governance when one is agreed upon.  
As in 2008, there is an expectation on the part of some EU stakeholders (as well as 
international partners), including the European Commission, some members states, the 
environmental NGOs and parts of the business community, that the EU would provide 
leadership by submitting, maybe ahead of the UN Secretary General’s summit in 
September 2014, an ‘aggressive’ target. At the same time, the expectation for a global 
carbon market has not yet materialised, with much preparatory activity in many 
jurisdictions, but with only the EU continuing to enforce a carbon pricing mechanism 
through the EU ETS, albeit for the moment at a low level. A decentralised climate change 
agreement and lack of clarity on equivalent carbon pricing can only lead to heightened 
uncertainty from a competitive point of view. 
A few conditions for the 2030 Framework   
On the basis of the above analysis, it is possible to formulate a number of conditions that the 
2030 Framework will need to meet.  
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  The Framework must be comprehensive, balanced and long-term/structural. A ‘narrow’ 
package will mean an acrimonious discussion and strong opposition from the same 
group (and more) that opposed back loading, with resulting delays in decision-making 
and prolonged ‘uncertainty’. Any proposal needs to be introduced and explained in a 
broader, long-term context and address systemic challenges. It needs to be balanced; the 
package will need to make the tools credible, but at the same time make provisions that 
make them realistic in today’s globally competitive world.  The issue of carbon price 
versus carbon cost must be recognised up front. A strong long-term carbon price signal is 
needed to drive investment and deploy low-carbon technologies. However, the fact that 
some sectors of the economy need predictable and stable protection and compensation 
while living in the world of asymmetrical carbon policies must also be recognised and 
addressed. In addition, an assumption of, and conditions for low prices does not make 
sense in conjunction with the status quo in measures for protection and compensation. 
The upcoming package should not shy away from making the distinction between 
recognising the complexity and overlapping nature of issues, and attempts by some 
stakeholders to block the discussion and postpone decisions. It should clearly address 
competitiveness and innovation as key components.  
 
  It needs to look ‘doable’ and ‘implementable’, not only in substance, but also in the 
timeline implied. The package will only have an impact if it is seen that its contents can 
become reality. Timelines that cannot be kept will mean a loss of credibility. It needs to 
recognise the realities of the EU and reckon with opposition to a ‘hasty approval’ from 
some member states. The EU domestic debate on energy and climate also needs to take 
into account the international climate change calendar, which expects a new agreement 
in 2015, with intermediate steps, such as an indication of the EU effort under the 
UNFCCC in September 2014 for the Ban Ki-Moon Summit, or early 2015 at the latest. It 
should also clearly identify what the EU stance internationally should be and the reasons 
why. It is now questionable to simply argue that the EU needs to provide leadership 
internationally. There is a need to show why that is in the interest of the EU and its 
practical implications. 
 
  There will be a need for flexibility and resilience to be able to adapt to different 
circumstances.  Carbon pricing, resulting from a regulatory market such as the EU ETS, is 
helped by provisions for supply-side flexibility, which emerges naturally in other – non- 
regulatory – markets.  As this is lacking in the EU ETS, a mechanism to mimic that 
reaction needs to be seriously considered, with an appropriate trigger. Note that a price 
trigger hardly seems compatible with the market nature of the EU ETS. At the same time, 
there is a need to recognise that no legislator or regulator can anticipate all events, 
including extreme events, and human judgment still needs to enter the equation, while 
avoiding the politically impossible solution of a ‘carbon bank’. This needs to be done in a 
way that shields the trigger from potential political gridlock. Such decision-making 
processes have been developed in other jurisdictions, such as Australia, where 
recommendations for caps are to be made to the legislation, with a pre-agreed, default, 
provision in case of political gridlock. 
 
  Finally, the package should make a distinction between ‘urgent fix’ and ‘long-term 
strategy’. There are a number of ‘no regrets’ measures that should be considered, while 
waiting for the broader package to make its way through the decision-making process. 
Addressing supply-side inflexibility in the EU ETS is such an example; regardless of 
what the final package consists of, this problem needs to be addressed, and there is no 
reason to wait for the entire package to be adopted. 